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The greatest moralizing and socializing force of all time.
Till at last the child's mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the child's mind. And not the child's mind only. The adult's mind too
- all his life long. The mind that judges and desires and decides - made up of
these suggestions. But all these suggestions are our suggestions! ... Suggestions from the State. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the unique forum of public schools, the quest for balance between student free speech and the State's interest in effectively educating those students is the source of an ongoing struggle.
Formulation of workable rules that strike a proper balance is made
especially difficult in this area because we have entrusted the education of our children to the State. Though many of us would not go so
far as to say we have placed our children in public schools to become
indoctrinated by the State according to majoritarian views, there is a
very real danger that, absent appropriate safeguards, subjecting our
children to compulsory state education could easily be transformed
into just such an activity.
The primary weapon used to ward off such a transformation is the
same weapon used to guarantee that minority views are not suppressed by government action in society at large: the First Amendment. By guaranteeing free speech to its citizens - even when such
speech is contrary to majoritarian thinking - the First Amendment
ensures that the government cannot force individuals into conformity
by dictating silence unless the situation allows for such an abridgment
of liberty. It is for this same reason that students are not stripped of
their First Amendment rights upon crossing the school's threshold.2
The First Amendment analysis generally applied to government
restrictions on speech, however, is ill-suited to the public school situation given the State's unique role as educator. By entrusting the development of our children to the State we have, in effect, given it a
license to inculcate values.3 For example, we all know that schools
teach us a great deal about what is "right" and "wrong." Most of us
agree that the use of civility in public discourse, respect for others,
and tolerance, among a host of other values, should be taught to our
children. The choice of these values, and thus the control of the
school's curriculum, properly rests with the elected school boards,
1. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 20 (Harper & Row 1965) (1932).
2. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-12 (1969)
(recognizing and resolving this conflict between majoritarian pressure and individual liberty in favor of students' rights).
3. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1987); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
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school officials, and teachers to whom we have entrusted the perform4
ance of this noble task.
This role, necessarily, implies the exclusion of contrary views the
school has chosen not to address, as well as the authority to restrict
speech that hinders the school's ability to effectively teach its chosen
curriculum. First Amendment concerns arise when a student attempts to voice a view contrary to the school's - a view that has been,
or is sought to be, excluded by those in control. As such, the judiciary
needs to answer significant questions as to what the school can do
under the guise of education. For instance, can a school silence a
speaker who espouses a view contrary to that being taught without
running afoul of the First Amendment? If so, under what circumstances are schools able to silence such speech: when it interferes
with the lesson being taught, when it poses a threat of substantial
disruption to discipline or the rights of others, or merely when it occurs on school property and the school simply does not agree with the
student's view?
The protection of student speech also has a purpose broader than
simply guarding against the potential for State abuses of its educational role. The very fabric of the First Amendment is implicated by
silencing our young speakers. An accurate understanding of the
power and scope of the First Amendment cannot be fostered in children by merely explaining its text and history in the classroom if the
school itself acts contrary to the precise lesson being taught. For example, if the State, vis-A-vis the school, is allowed to sanction a student each time he utters a view in opposition to its view, he will
become reluctant to voice his opinion out of fear. In such a situation,
the State teaches its students that what the Constitution provides in
5
theory, should not be relied upon in reality.
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence addresses
these issues in a way that balances the competing interests of the
First Amendment with those of the State as educator and insures the
perseverance of a proper understanding of the First Amendment in
4. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Fraser,478 U.S. at 686.
5. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. That being said, a paradox exists in allowing children such freedoms. For an in depth treatment of this issue see Stanley Ingber,
Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 421 (1995), which explores "[t]he paradox [of granting liberty to children
[which] stems from the realization that society must indoctrinate children so that
they may be capable of autonomy." Id. at 429. Perhaps it is for this reason that
some courts have relied upon the age of the speaker in justifying suppression.
See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that, on a claim of qualified immunity by school personnel, a student's right
to wear expressive T-shirts was not "clearly established" given her elementary
school age).
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our future leaders. The "trilogy" of cases 6 devoted to this subject allows a school to restrict student speech if the school proffers a sufficient justification. That is, if the speech substantially interferes with
school discipline, the work of the school, or the rights of other students, it can be restricted. 7 Alternatively, if the speech takes place
during an activity that can fairly be characterized as part of the curriculum, restrictions will be justified if the school can show that its
8
actions were motivated by a legitimate pedagogical concern.
This Note's purpose is to explore the Sixth Circuit's flawed understanding of this trilogy in its evaluation of a school's restriction of student speech in Boroff v. City of Van Wert Board of Education.9 Simply
put, the court found no justification for the school's actions in the form
of substantial interference or control of its curriculum, but rather,
found the school's actions proper simply because the student's speech
was "offensive."1o The court's use of "offensiveness" as a justification,
however, is plainly out of sorts with a reasoned understanding of the
case law. If indeed the uninhibited ability of the school to sanction a
student for "offensive" speech does exist, the court's use of such an
exception in Boroff swallows the generally applicable rules.
In order to fully appreciate the flaws in the Boroff opinion, one
needs to closely analyze each of the three cases handed down by the
Supreme Court in this area. Part II, therefore, provides a detailed
account of this "trilogy." Part III then outlines the Boroff court's opinion. With this background, Part IV evaluates the reasoning of Boroff
in light of the Supreme Court's trilogy of cases, identifying two key
flaws in the Boroff opinion: section IV.A addresses the court's failure
to engage in an evaluation of whether substantial interference or curricular control justified the school's actions, and section IV.B discusses
the court's unprincipled application of its "offensive" rationale to
Boroffs speech. Part V concludes with a brief summary of Part IV and
this author's views as to why the First Amendment should flourish in
public schools.

6. This trilogy includes Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,478 U.S. 675
(1986), and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1987).
7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
8. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
9. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001).
10. Id. at 468-71.
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II.

FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: THE TRILOGY

The Substantial Interference Test: Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District

A.

The Court's first modern evaluation of the First Amendment in
public schools was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District." Under Tinker, a school is justified in suppressing
student speech only upon a showing that the speech would cause "substantial interference" with the work of the school, appropriate discipline, or the rights of others. 12 This case relied upon the basic notion
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 13
In December 1965, fifteen-year-old John F. Tinker and friends
wore black armbands to school in protest of the hostilities of Vietnam
and to show support for a truce.14 The school district's principals, in
response to prior information about the students' intentions, met and
passed a policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands with the ultimate
penalty being suspension. Two days later the students wore their
armbands to school, refused to remove them, and were sent home. Asserting that the school had infringed upon his civil rights, Tinker filed
a § 1983 action in the United States District Court.15 The district
court dismissed the complaint1 6 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap7
peals affirmed the dismissal en banc without issuing an opinion.'
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and held
that the wearing of armbands to communicate a particular view could
not justifiably be enjoined by the school where there was no evidence
that the armbands would substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the school, the work of the school, or
the rights of other students.' 8 This "substantial interference" test
struck a balance between the need for students to retain their First
Amendment rights in the schools and the need for school officials to
retain the control necessary to carry out their educational task.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 504-05.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. There was some suspicion of a potential for disruption
because a former student had been killed in Vietnam and students at another
high school said they would wear armbands of different colors in support of the
military effort if the black armbands were allowed. The Court, however, did not
find such evidence sufficient to warrant any anticipation that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the schools, appropriate
discipline, or the rights of others. See id. at 509 n.3.
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The Court opined at length about the significance of student First
Amendment rights in the schools:
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.' 9
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
20
selection.

The Court went on to state that the guarantee of First Amendment
freedoms to students was meant to combat transforming state-operated schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism," and to avoid a situation
where students are "regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate." 2 1
Of course, the Court indicated that these sound principles did not
constitute an absolute guarantee of liberty in the schools given the
"need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."22
Thus, the substantial interference test was implemented to enable the
realization of each competing policy. 23 The Court, however, was careful to note that any interference posed by a student's speech must indeed be "substantial":
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from
absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on
the campus, that deviated from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk, and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom - this kind
of openness - that is the basis of our national strength and of the indepen19. Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(holding that the State could not require public school students to salute the
flag)).
20. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted)).
21. Id. at 511.
22. Id. at 507.
23. Justice Black's scathing dissent viewed this balance as overly protective of students and underprotective of school authority. Likening school discipline to parental discipline he stated that such control "is an integral and important part of
training our children to be good citizens - to be better citizens." Id. at 524. He
concluded that to allow students to prevail in these sorts of cases would be to
"hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected
school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students." Id. at 526.
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dence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permis24
sive, often disputatious, society.

With these principles firmly in hand, the Court did not limit its
holding to any particular setting. In fact, the Court opined that a student may voice his or her opinion on controversial subjects during
classroom hours, in the cafeteria, on the playing field, or on campus
during school hours, so long as he or she does not substantially interfere with appropriate discipline, the work of the school, or the rights of
25
others.
B.

Restricting Vulgar, Lewd, or Offensive Speech: Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser

The Supreme Court's next opinion concerning the First Amendment rights of school students was Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v.
Fraser.26 Fraser stands for the proposition that school officials can
restrict lewd, vulgar, or offensive language where such language interferes with the school's work or is potentially damaging to younger students. The case also signals a partial shift by the Court in favor of
school authority. While some courts have indicated this case "casts
some doubt upon" the viability of Tinker,27 better reasoning leads to
exthe conclusion that this case either follows Tinker or is a narrow
28
ception to its more general "substantial interference" test.
The case was initiated in response to Matthew N. Fraser's suspension for violating school policy in delivering a candidacy speech at a
school-sponsored assembly as part of the student government program
at the school. 29 The basis for the punishment was the "elaborate
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" Fraser used in supporting his
candidate. 30 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Fraser's First Amendment rights had been vio24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 508-09 (citations omitted).
Id. at 512-13.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281-82 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Fraserfollows Tinker); cases cited infra note 130 (regarding Fraser as a discrete area of school authority); infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (regarding Fraseras a precursor to Hazelwood).
29. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
30. Id. at 678. The speech went as follows:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the
students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things
in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he
succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each
and every one of you.
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lated as his speech was "indistinguishable from the protest armbands
1
in Tinker."3
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the school was within its
rights. The Court distinguished Fraser's case from Tinker in two
ways. First, the restriction imposed upon Fraser, unlike the school's
action in Tinker, was not based upon any viewpoint or message he was
seeking to communicate; rather, the restriction was based upon the
speech's sexual content, vulgarity, lewdness, and indecency. 32 Second, the Court emphasized that Tinker did "not concern speech or action that intrude[d] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students," and indicated that Fraser's speech qualified as such an
33
intrusion.
The Court justified its decision upon two grounds: the school's ability to fend off interference with its work and its ability to protect
younger students from speech such as Fraser's. 3 4 The Court first
noted that the public education system has as one of its paramount
objectives the "inculcat[ion ofi fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system," 3 5 and that given this
goal, it is most certainly the "work of the schools" to be able to instill
fundamental values that disfavor the use of terms of debate highly
offensive or highly threatening to others. 3 6 Thus, the Court held that
part of the school's educational mission is to instill in students the
belief that certain modes of expression are inappropriate.
The Court then went on to reason that because schools and older
children teach by example, essentially as role models, the school need
not tolerate lewd, indecent, or offensive student speech because to do
so would interfere with its goal of teaching students that such speech
is not acceptable. 37 Since Fraser's speech was "plainly offensive,"
given its glorification of male sexuality and its vulgarity, lewdness,
and indecency, and since it bore the imprimatur of the school, given its
placement within a school-sponsored assembly, the Court found that
the school had the power to dissociate itself from Fraser's comments

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between
you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
Id. at 681-85.
Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker, 478 U.S. at 508). The Court buttressed this observation by analogizing it to the ability of Congress "[to prohibit] the use of expressions offensive to other participants" by citing to The Manual of Parliamentary
Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, which prohibits the use of "indecent language." Id. at 681.
Id. at 683.
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by punishing him in order to make the point to students that such
speech was inconsistent with what was acceptable in public discourse;
38
in other words, his speech interfered with the school's work.
The Court also determined that the sexual content of Fraser's
speech "could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience." 3 9 By citing to the long line of cases protecting young children,
especially in a captive audience, from vulgar, sexually explicit, or indecent (but not obscene) language, the Court further justified its
40
decision.
The Court then concluded its reasoning by turning to the words of
Justice Murphy to indicate its historical reluctance to extend First
Amendment protection to obscene or indecent language: "[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."4 1
C.

Restricting Student Speech Occurring Within the
Curriculum: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

The Supreme Court's most recent articulation of student speech
rights is contained in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.4 2 The
Hazelwood opinion is a marked departure from the standard imposed
by Tinker. In fact, the Court specifically rejects Tinker as applicable
to the restriction of student speech occurring within curricular
events. 4 3 Under Hazelwood, a school's restriction of speech that oc38. Id. at 685-86.
39. Id. at 683.
40. Id. at 684-85 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736 (1978); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942)).
41. Id. at 685 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572)). Justice Brennan disagreed with this reasoning in his concurrence because
he felt the language used by Fraser was far removed from what the Court normally deemed obscene, vulgar, or indecent. Id. at 688 (citing Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). His
concurrence went on to agree with the Court's holding in that, under the circumstances of the case, he believed the school was correct in determining that such
speech disrupted its educational mission; however, he stated that the speech
"may well have been protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining
civil public discourse were less weighty." Id. at 689. He concluded his opinion
with the observation: "Courts have a First Amendment responsibility to insure
that robust rhetoric ... is not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the
vigorous from the vulgar." Id. at 689-90 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
42. 484 U.S. 260 (1987).
43. Id. at 272.
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curs within one of these events will be allowed so long as it is moti44
vated by a legitimate pedagogical concern.
The case was filed in response to the school principal's removal of a
two-page section from the school newspaper. The principal removed
these pages because of two articles they contained. One article discussed three students' experiences with pregnancy and the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school. 45 The principal
chose to delete the two pages because he was concerned that the identity of the pregnant teens was not adequately concealed, the article's
reference to sexual behavior and birth control was inappropriate for
some of the younger readers, and the parents of the child who was the
subject of the divorce article were not given a chance to respond to its
46
accusations.
The district court, which decided the case before Fraser was
handed down, did not apply Tinker's substantial interference test. Instead, it denied the injunctive relief sought by the student editors and
found that "school officials may impose restraints on students' speech
in activities that are an integral part of the school's educational function - including the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper by a
journalism class - so long as their decision had a substantial and reasonable basis."4 7 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the newspaper was a public forum and that, as such, its
contents could not be censored except where justified under Tinker.48
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 264 (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1466
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (citations omitted)).
48. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986). These
lower court opinions, and their subsequent visitation in the Supreme Court, mark
the official entry of the public forum doctrine into this area. Application of the
public forum doctrine to the Boroff case is unnecessary. The only relevant distinction between a public and a non-public forum is that in the former contentbased restrictions are not valid unless justified under strict scrutiny, while in the
latter such justification can be achieved under a lower standard - that depicted
by the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (stating that in a designated public
forum, the government can only restrict speech based on content if the restriction
is "narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest"); Hazelwood, 484
U.S. 260 (evaluating restrictions on student speech in a non-public forum).
Since there is not enough evidence contained in the opinion to adduce whether
a public forum was created for Boroffs expression, and the public forum doctrine
was not applied by the court, this Note will not undertake to apply such an analysis but will assume that no public forum was created. Operating under this assumption does not cast any doubt on this Note's analysis of Boroff. Even under
the decreased standard afforded by Tinker, Fraser,and Hazelwood, the school's
actions in Boroff are not justified; thus a fortiori, the school's actions could not be
validated under the more demanding test of strict scrutiny. It is also worth noting that, to the extent the school in Boroff may have engaged in viewpoint dis-
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The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, finding
that the school could properly "exercis[e] editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 4 9 This decision marks the firm engrafting of
separate standards for evaluating a school's restriction of student
speech based on where the speech occurs. Student speech that occurs
within an activity that can "fairly be characterized as part of the
school curriculum" is more easily restricted than student speech that
50
merely "happens to occur on the school premises." The former category of speech includes "school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 5 1 The Court opined that such curricular events
need not occur in the classroom "so long as they are supervised by
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
52
The Court left the latskills to student participants and audiences."
ter form of 3speech - purely personal student speech - to be governed
5
by Tinker.
The Court cited three justifications for a school's increased power
to restrict curricular speech: for the school to assure "[1] that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, [2] that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and [3] that the views of the individ54
The Court
ual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school."
Tinker and
in
also synthesized its holding with its prior opinions
Fraser:
[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer
of a school play "disassociate itself," Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685, not only from
speech that would "substantially interfere with [it's] work ...or impinge upon
the rights of other students," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, but also from speech
that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched,
biased or 5 5prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature
audiences.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

crimination, that is, suppressed one view from discussion in favor of another,
such action would not be allowed in either a public or a non-public forum. See
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-94
(1993) (holding that even if a public forum wasn't created by the school district,
viewpoint discrimination was contrary to the dictates of the First Amendment).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 271.
Id. Disagreeing with the dissent, the Court also noted at this point that Fraser
was not merely a reification of Tinker but rather "rested on the 'vulgar,' 'lewd'
and 'plainly offensive' character of a speech delivered at an official school assem-
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Simply stated, when a student's speech is school-sponsored, the
school can restrict the speaker in order to shield its students from potentially sensitive topics or it can refuse to lend its name and resources to speech that is inconsistent with "the shared values of a
civilized social order"56 so long as such action is motivated by legitimate pedagogical concerns. Judicial intervention in the decisions of
school boards in this area will only be merited where the restriction
has no valid educational purpose. 57
Justice Brennan wrote a scornful dissent in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. The dissent conceded that in some instances student expression directly prevents the school from achieving
its educational goals; however, the dissent felt that a departure from
Tinker was not necessary in order to recognize this ability.58 For instance, when a student stands in calculus class to deliver a speech on
the merits of democracy or, as in Fraser,where a lewd speech is made
in support of a student government candidate during a school-sponsored assembly, the pedagogical goal of the activity - to teach calculus
in the former and acceptable public discourse in the latter - is materially and substantially disrupted; thus, the school may silence the
speaker under Tinker.59 The dissent noted, however, that speech
which only conflicts with the message of the school cannot be restricted.6 0 For example, in a political science class, where a student
responds to a question from the instructor by stating "socialism is
good," or, as in Tinker, where a student passively expresses his opposition to the conflict in Vietnam, the school is not justified in silencing
the student lest the schools are to be transformed into "enclaves of
totalitarianism."61
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's imposition of differing standards applicable to speech occurring within the school's curriculum and speech that only occurs on the school premises by noting
that such a distinction could not be found under the Court's jurisprudence in this area. 6 2 The dissent observed that in Fraserthe speech
took place at a school-sponsored event but that fact did not give
credence to the dichotomy promulgated by the majority because Fra-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

bly rather than on any propensity of the speech to 'materially disrup[t] classwork
or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."' Id. at 272
n.4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
Id. at 273.
Id. at 277-91 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
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ser clearly 63followed Tinker, which did not even mention curricular
placement.
Justice Brennan further attacked each one of the three justifications offered by the majority in support of this dual standard. He
found that the first concern, the prerogative of the school to control
the curriculum, was fully addressed by Tinker because speech that octhe curricular
curs within a curricular event is more likely to disrupt
64
The second confunction than when it arises in another context.
cern, assuring that young audiences are shielded from sensitive topics, was found by the dissent to be an easy avenue for viewpoint
discrimination 6 5 used to "transform students into 'closed-circuit 66recipFiients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."
nally, the dissent concluded that the third justification, school
disassociation from that which it wishes not to condone, could have
67
been achieved through more narrow means such as a disclaimer.
III.

BOROFF V. VAN WERT CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

It is against the backdrop of these three Supreme Court decisions
that the Sixth Circuit addressed Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education.68 Nicholas Boroff, a senior at Van Wert High School, appeared
69
at school on August 29, 1997, wearing a Marilyn Manson T-shirt.
The front of the shirt included the band's name and a rendering of a
three-faced Jesus along with the words "See No Truth. Hear No Truth.
Speak No Truth." On the back of the shirt was the word "BELIEVE"
70
School officials decided the shirt
with the letters "LIE" highlighted.
violated the school's "Dress and Grooming" policy, which provided that
"clothing with offensive illustrations, drug, alcohol, or tobacco slogans
7
...[is] not acceptable." 1 Boroff was told he could either turn the
shirt inside-out, go home and change, or leave and be considered truant. Boroff went home and did not return that day. On each of the
next four days Boroff wore different Marilyn Manson T-shirts to
school, each displaying a picture of the band's lead singer. On each
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 286 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
511 (1969)).
Id. at 289.
220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001).
Id. at 467. Marilyn Manson is a rock band that is classified in the "goth" genre.
The title is both the name of the band and the stage name of the band's lead
singer, Brian Warner. Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
Id.
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day he was sent home and did not return. Boroff later initiated a
§ 1983 action against the school.72
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
entered summary judgment for the school. The court concluded that
"[a] school may prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt that is offensive, but not obscene, on school grounds, even if the T-shirt has not
been shown to cause a substantial disruption of the academic program,"7 3 and further, found that "the school did not act in a manifestly
unreasonable manner in finding the T-shirts offensive."74
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court upon a de novo review.75 In so doing, the court applied the
Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwoodtrilogy to find the school's actions permissible under the First Amendment.76 The court's reasoning discarded
Tinker because it concluded that no viewpoint had been restricted by
the school, and then utilized Fraser as the applicable standard for
evaluating restrictions of "offensive" speech. It then supported its position with the increased power of school authorities articulated in
Hazelwood.77
In reaching this conclusion, the court first summarized Tinker and
then discussed Fraseras "cast[ing] some doubt on the extent to which
students retain free speech rights in the school setting."78 The court
explained Fraseras distinguishing itself from Tinker because the suppression of the vulgar and offensive speech at issue in Fraserwas "unrelated to any political viewpoint." 79 The court also cited Fraser for
the proposition that "the school district had the authority to determine
that the vulgar and lewd speech at issue would undermine the school's
basic educational mission."80
The court characterized Hazelwood as echoing Fraser's position
that a school's basic educational mission entitles it to restrict speech
that it would be unable to censor outside of the school.81 Under Hazelwood, the court opined, the school was justified in restricting a student's speech so long as the restriction "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 82 The court then noted the distinction, articulated by the Court in Hazelwood, between Tinker and Fra72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 468 (quoting Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir.
1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 469 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
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ser in that the latter rested on the "vulgar and offensive character of
the speech," while the former rested on the "propensity of the speech
83
materially to disrupt classwork or involve substantial disorder."
Given these perceived differences, the court concluded that Fraserwas
"the standard for reviewing the suppression of vulgar or plainly offenwhere the restriction is not based on the speaker's
sive speech"
84
viewpoint.
In applying the principles it derived from Tinker, Fraser,and Hazelwood, the court rejected Boroffs assertion that the decision of the
school was manifestly unreasonable because the T-shirts could not
85
The court rejected this contenfairly be characterized as offensive.
tion even though Boroff presented evidence that T-shirts promoting
other bands, such as "Slayer" and "Megadeth," were permitted by the
was the wearing of Marilyn Manson patches by other
school, as
86
students.
The court instead opined that the record indicated the school found
all of Boroffs T-shirts offensive because Marilyn Manson "promotes
values that are contrary to the
destructive conduct and demoralizing
87
Specifically, the court accepted
educational mission of the school."
Jesus" T-shirt was
"three-headed
the
that
the principal's assertions
Truth. Speak No
No
Hear
Truth.
No
"See
the
of
because
offensive
Truth" mantra and the "obvious implication" of the word "BELIEVE"
88
The principal also stated that the distorted
(highlighted as such).
Jesus figure was contrary to the school's educational mission of teaching values of tolerance; establishing "a common core of values that include . . . human dignity and worth . . . self respect, and
responsibility"8 9 ; and instilling "into the students, an understanding
and appreciation of the ideals of democracy and help[ing] them to be
diligent and competent in the performance of their obligations as
citizens." 90
In expanding upon the justifications used by the principal to restrict the three-headed Jesus T-shirt, the court noted that the views
associated with Marilyn Manson in the press, and those espoused by
the band in its lyrics, were reasonably attributed to Boroffs wearing of
the T-shirts generally because, as the principal stated, "[the TI-shirts
can reasonably be considered a communication agreeing with or approving of the views espoused by Marilyn Manson in its lyrics and...
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 469 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n.4).
at 471.
at 469.

at 470.
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associated to Marilyn Manson through articles in the press."91 Additional evidence included affidavits of other school officials stating that
they perceived the T-shirts to be counter-productive and against the
basic educational mission of the school.92 The court also found the
record "devoid of any evidence that the T-shirts ...were perceived to
express any particular political or religious viewpoint."93
Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the district court
was correct in finding that the school did not act in a manifestly unreasonable manner in prohibiting the T-shirts from being worn pursuant to its dress code. "[W]here Boroffs T-shirts contain[ed] symbols
and words that promote[d] values that are so patently contrary to the
school's educational mission, the School ha[d] the authority, under the
circumstances of this case, to prohibit those T-shirts."94
The court expressly disfavored the view espoused by the dissent,
which found evidence that the school engaged in viewpoint discrimination such that a finding of substantial disruption would be necessary under Tinker to justify the school's actions. 95 In so doing, the
court stated that the record demonstrated that the school prohibited
all of the T-shirts because of their promotion of "disruptive and demoralizing values."96 Since the T-shirts were banned because they were
determined to be "vulgar, offensive, and contrary to the educational
mission of the school," 97 the actions of the school were allowed under
Fraser.98
Judge Gilman's dissent found three areas of the majority opinion
that were incompatible with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
this area: 1) the evidence suggesting that the school engaged in viewpoint discrimination, 2) the majority's misapprehension of the meaning of the terms "vulgar" and "offensive," and 3) the majority's failure
to note the distinction between Fraser and Hazelwood on the one
hand, and Tinker on the other, in that school-sponsorship is required
in the former and not in the latter.99
91. Id. at 469. The court went on to describe magazine articles depicting the artist as
an admitted drug user and quotes the lyrics of some of Marilyn Manson's songs:
"you can kill yourself now because you're dead in my mind," "let's jump upon the
sharp swords/and cut away our smiles/without the threat of death/there's no reason to live at all," and "Let's just kill everyone and let your god sort them out/
Fuck it/Everbody's someone else's nigger/l know you are so am Il[wasn't born
with enough middle fingers." Id. at 470.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

96. Id. at 471.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 472-76 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
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Judge Gilman began by noting that summary judgment is inappropriate in civil rights cases where "disputed and material questions
about the reasonableness of an official's actions or about an official's
intent" exist.1 00 He then opined that he saw just such a question as to
the intent of the school officials in that the evidence suggested they
may have declared Boroffs T-shirts "offensive" for impermissible reasons. The three-headed Jesus T-shirt, as stated in the principal's affidavit, was deemed "offensive" because it mocked a religious figure,
which was particularly offensive to many people in the school; thus, it
appeared to the dissent that it was the message expressed through the
10 1
shirt that was the basis for the school's finding of offensiveness.
Noting that school officials have very wide latitude in their administrative restrictions on speech in the wake of Fraserand Hazelwood,
the dissent nevertheless concluded that such evidence of viewpoint
02
In the dissent's
discrimination precluded summary judgment.1
viability to the
gave
viewpoint
religious
view, evidence of a perceived
precisely be"offensive"
shirt
the
deemed
school
the
conclusion that
cause many people in the school vehemently opposed the message it
by an
conveyed.' 03 "T]aking sides in that manner... is accompanied
10 4
unconstitutionality."
of
all-but-irrebuttable presumption
The dissent then opined that the majority's use of the term "offensive" was out of sorts with the case law on the subject. In the dissent's
view, such a characterization applies to words and phrases that are
1 05
like George Carlin's famous list of
"themselves coarse and crude"
10 6
The dissent noted that if the lyrics of Marilyn Man"dirty words."
son's songs had been displayed on the T-shirt, offensiveness or vulgarity could easily be found; however, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's finding that no evidence existed to suggest that the school
found the T-shirts offensive because of the unpopular viewpoint Boroff
07
expressed, rather than on the character of the words themselves.'
Next, the dissent attacked the majority's adoption of the school's
characterization that the T-shirts represented disruptive or demoralizing values. In fact, the dissent noted that since the school did not
explain what disruptive or demoralizing values the T-shirts promoted,
a reasonable jury could have found that the values it was speaking of
were Boroff's disrespect for Christian beliefs; thereby offering further
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)). Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue was based upon the seven words: "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
mother-fucker, and tits." PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 751.
107. Id. at 473-74.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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evidence that it was the view espoused by the speaker, rather than the
form of the expression, that was the basis for the school's action.1OS
Furthermore, the dissent opined that the promotion of disruptive
and demoralizing values may not have been enough to censor the student. The school officials in Tinker, in all likelihood, would have found
that the speech there promoted disruptive and demoralizing, not to
mention unpatriotic, values; however, silencing that speech could not
be allowed absent a showing of "material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline."109 Thus, the dissent concluded that
even if a particular view is offensive to some, it cannot be restricted
without complying with Tinker.11o
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's notion that
Tinker was inapplicable. According to the dissent, the majority apparently reasoned that Fraser and Hazelwood allow restrictions on
speech so long as the speech is offensive and the actions of the school
are not manifestly unreasonable. But, the dissent reasoned, while
both opinions did confer more authority to school officials in controlling the school, both rested on the proposition that the school "might
reasonably have been thought to be endorsing or condoning the student expression at issue had they taken no action."lll The dissent
concluded that since a school cannot reasonably be thought to condone
or endorse T-shirts that it fails to ban, especially in the secondary
school context, Tinker was the only case that could be applicable.11 2
IV.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S FLAWED ANALYSIS

Since Tinker, use of the First Amendment to protect student
speech in the secondary school setting has seen little success. Hazelwood and Fraser have limited the ability of students to speak their
minds where the school's curricular power is implicated. Nonetheless,
the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Boroff represents a flawed application of
the increased ability of school officials to silence student views afforded by Hazelwood and Fraser. Specifically, Boroff uses Fraser and
Hazelwood to justify a school's suppression of student speech that does
not implicate the school's curricular power - speech that merely happens to occur on the school property. This is clearly wrong because
only speech that occurs within a setting that can "fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum"113 is subject to restriction under
Fraserand Hazelwood; in all other cases Tinker provides the proper
108. Id. at 474.
109. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 475.
112. Id.
113. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
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standard. To construe these cases as the Boroff court did, establishes
an exception that swallows Tinker's rule and disregards the principles
upon which it was founded.
Section IV.A first analyzes the Boroff court's failure to recognize
the distinction between speech that occurs within a curricular event
and purely personal student speech. The thrust of this analysis is the
Boroff court's flawed interpretation of Fraser. Second, section IV.B
shows that, even if Frasercan be extended beyond the curricular context that Hazelwood found necessary to such restrictions, the court's
unprincipled application of the term "offensive" to Boroffs speech was
clearly wrong.
A.

Student Speech Occurring Within a Curricular Event v.
Purely Personal Student Speech

The key principle missed by the Boroff court is that Tinker's substantial interference test is applicable to all speech that does not occur
within an activity that implicates the school's authority over its curriculum. Instead, the Boroff court treated Fraser as the applicable
standard, that is, as representing an exception to Tinker that allows
schools to restrict lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech regardless of where
that speech occurs. 1 1 4 While Frasercan reasonably be interpreted as
either applying Tinker or applying the same standard as was recognized later in Hazelwood, it simply cannot represent the unfettered
school authority to restrict vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech for which
the Boroff court interprets it to stand, lest Tinker, and the principles
upon which it was grounded, are to be thrown by the wayside.
This section first explains what qualifies as a curricular event and
the reasons for applying higher standards to the restriction of student
speech that does not occur within such an event. Next, since the
Boroff court completely missed this fundamental premise by reasoning that Fraser supplied the proper analysis, the propriety of this interpretation of Fraser is discussed. Finally, in order to show the
unsoundness of the Boroff court's interpretation of Fraser,the correct
interpretations of Fraserare discussed along with the likely outcomes
had the Boroff court engaged in the proper analysis.
As Hazelwood clearly shows, only activities that can reasonably be
perceived as coming under the school's auspices qualify as curricular
events, that is, activities that are supervised by faculty members and
are designed to impart either knowledge or skill to the student or the
audience. 1 15 When speech occuring within such events is restricted,
the school need only show its actions were based upon a legitimate
114. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 469.
115. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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pedagogical concern. 1 16 Thus, when a student stands to profess his
view of United States foreign policy on Afghanistan during a calculus
class, the school may constitutionally prohibit such speech.11 7 The
calculus class could be nothing less than curricular, and the educational purpose that motivates the restriction is the legitimate goal of
teaching calculus. Similarly, the same would be true of Boroffs shirts
if he wished to wear them, instead of the school-mandated uniform,
during the homecoming football game. The football game is curricular
as it is designed to teach discipline, teamwork, and fair play to the
student participants; it is supervised by school officials; and to allow
the shirt could reasonably be perceived by the viewing public as the
school's endorsement of the message contained thereon. Furthermore,
the restriction would be motivated by the legitimate educational concern of teaching students that uniformity overcomes individuality in a
team sport.
As Hazelwood illustrates, a school has greater authority within its
curriculum because of the public schools' role as inculcator of societal
values and the authority that must accompany that role to insure its
realization, i.e., the ability to restrict that which is contrary to it's basic educational mission. 1 18 However, when speech cannot reasonably
be construed to occur within a curricular event, the justifications for
school-imposed restrictions are not present and Tinker demands a
more exacting standard. In such instances the school can only restrict
personal expression - that which merely happens to occur on the
school premises - when it materially and substantially interferes with
appropriate discipline, the work of the school, or the rights of other
students.119
This limitation on a school's ability to restrict student expression
exists for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, it ensures the marketplace of ideas remains intact. Given the fact that schools have universal control of their curriculum, and therefore their teachers, one of
the few ways in which a student can receive information that is inconsistent with the views the State wishes to promulgate is through other
students. Students have a palpable right to receive ideas.120 The
116. Id. at 273.
117. See id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (using a similar hypothetical to show
Tinker would allow the school's restriction under such circumstances).
118. See id. at 271.
119. See id. at 270-71.
120. The notion that the "marketplace of ideas" gives students the right to receive
information is not controversial. Such was the basis for the Court's holding in
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 503 (1982), where the Court found that
books described by the school as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic,
and just plain filthy," id. at 857, could not be removed from the school library
under the auspices of curricular control because students have the right to receive ideas. See id. at 866-68. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-
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learning that occurs within the school setting is not solely attributed
to the classroom but also takes place in the halls, the cafeteria, and on
the campus during school hours.12 1 While the State may have blanket
control over its curriculum, these other areas of learning are not subject to that censure. The State is only allotted that amount of influence in these outside areas as results from the inculcation of its beliefs
within the curriculum.122 As a result, it is outside the curriculum
that the marketplace of ideas is given meaning by enabling students
to choose among a variety of ways in which to explain the world
around them: "to discover truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,'
123
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."
Tinker, which remains good law and is still cited by the Court,124
was premised upon this very notion: that student learning cannot be
totally controlled by the State if the marketplace of ideas is to remain
intact.125 If this fundamental principle is to retain any legitimacy,
courts cannot infringe upon Tinker's standard in areas outside of the
school's curriculum.
Another justification for insuring the ability of students to have
the unfettered ability to pronounce views that are at odds with, or not
even part of, the curriculum is to further buttress the power of the
First Amendment itself. How are students to fully appreciate the values of our democratic society if students' ability to speak their minds
about certain matters outside of the curriculum is tempered by the
State's inculcation goal?12 6 If throughout the student's experience
with the State's authority - his educational life - the student is silenced based on his views, he will necessarily learn that the First
Amendment is nothing more than constitutional lip-service that offers

121.

122.

123.
124.

125.
126.

63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (all standing for this notion of student rights).
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969)
(noting that communication among students is an important part of the educational process).
In many instances this may be enough to effectively indoctrinate the young mind
to majoritarian thinking; especially where students do not critically examine the
teachings laid before them.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)), quoted in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000), cited in
Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 475 (6th Cir. 2000) (Gilman,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001).
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-12.
Ironically, the ability to restrict student speech in the curricular area is premised
on the fact that the school is the inculcator of values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic society. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681
(1986). Such restrictions, though plainly allowed by the Court, seem to directly
contradict this goal if we regard the First Amendment as just such a value.
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no real protection.127 As a result, if that indoctrinated citizen is brave
enough to privately question the State later in life, he will be reluctant
to voice his view despite the very real protections the First Amendment guarantees.
It is for these reasons that differing standards are applied to school
restrictions on student speech when it occurs within a curricular event
and when it does not. The Boroff court, though, completely missed
this very important point. The court adopted the lower standard applied to student speech restrictions under Hazelwood without opining
as to why such a lower standard was merited. Clearly, Hazelwood allowed a lower standard than that articulated in Tinker because the
school must be afforded enough control over its curriculum to effectively teach; however, this curricular control is not implicated by
speech that does not occur within a curricular event; thus, Hazelwood's lower standard is inapplicable to speech that does not occur
within a curricular event. 128 As such, Tinker provides the proper
standard for evaluating school suppression of student speech and the
reasons for allowing the expression of student views are directly applicable. Nonetheless, the Boroff court ignored the curricular placement
requirement. It evaluated the school's actions under a lesser standard
than Tinker because it found, in effect, that Fraserrepresented an exception to Tinker's rule - that schools have the ability to restrict vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech regardless of its disruptive effect or
curricular placement. 129 This conclusion is clearly at odds with a reasoned understanding of Fraserin light of Tinker and Hazelwood.
Frasercan be considered as representing one of three possibilities:
1) the Court's adherence to the Tinker disruption standard, 2) a precursor to the Hazelwood decision in that it requires restricted speech
to have occurred within a curricular event, or 3) a distinct area of authority for schools to regulate vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech regardless of its occurrence within the curriculum or its potential for
substantial interference. 130 While the Boroff court adopted the third
possibility, this interpretation is unjustified given the facts and rea127. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. The fact that students learn through their experiences and observations in the school cannot be denied. In fact, in order to justify
its holding, the Court in Fraserrelied upon the notion that school officials and
other students teach as role models. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, 685-86.
128. See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying the schoolsponsorship criteria to uphold the ability of a school to sanction a student for a
speech denouncing a school official given as part of a school-sponsored election
campaign); Desilets v. Clearview Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 630 A.2d 333, 338 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (adhering to this principle in the context of characterizing an extra-curricular participation newspaper as a school-sponsored event
under Hazelwood); cases cited infra note 144.
129. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 469.
130. A few courts have determined that the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy can be
summarized pursuant to this third possibility:
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soning of Fraserand the way that case was treated in Hazelwood. The
propriety of these interpretations and their application to the facts of
Boroff will be discussed in turn.
As to the first possibility, Fraser can reasonably be construed as
merely following Tinker's substantial interference standard. As noted
by Justice Brennan's dissent in Hazelwood, the Court's analysis in
Fraser tends to reinforce the idea that it was merely adhering to
Tinker.13 1 The Court in Fraseropined that the inculcation of values
commensurate with the idea of what is proper in public discourse was
the "work of the schools."1 32 Thus, substantial interference with "the
work of the schools" could be said to justify the imposition of restrictions on student speech and bring that case under Tinker.13 3 As such,
the Boroff court would have been bound to apply Tinker which would
require a finding that the message portrayed by the T-shirt caused, or
was reasonably predicted to cause, a 34material and substantial interference with the work of the school.1 The court did not do so, per-

131.
132.
133.

134.

Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language. Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech (that is, speech that a reasonable observer would view as
the school's own speech) on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern. Speech falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker's general rule: it may be regulated only if it would substantially disrupt
school operations or interfere with the rights of others.
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001); See also
Chandler v. McMinnvill Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992); Pyle v. S.
Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass. 1994) (both adhering to
same interpretation). Notably, in a Comment published after this Note was in
press, Jonathan Pyle, one of the litigants in Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee, attacked the holding of Pyle, critically examined many of the student expression cases, and concluded that Tinker provides the proper standard in all such
cases in Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 586 (2002).
Given the language used in Fraserand Hazelwood, other equally reasonable
evaluations may lead to different conclusions, and, insofar as one may be drawn
to the characterization of courts like Saxe, it gives no credence to the Boroff
court's conclusion because Boroffs speech does not qualify as lewd, vulgar, or profane, nor can it be characterized as not expressing a viewpoint. See infra text
accompanying notes 152-82.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281-82 (1987).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
This potential interpretation may turn on whether the "work of the schools" extends beyond "classwork," the disruption of which the Hazelwood majority expressly stated was not the basis for the Fraser decision. See supra note 55.
Compare Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n.4 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513), with
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). Given the expanded
notion of the "work of the schools" adopted by the FraserCourt, which includes
the "inculcation of... values," Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, such may indeed extend
beyond "classwork."
See Tinker 393 U.S. at 508.
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haps because the issue was not framed properly,13 5 but more likely
because the record before it would not support such a finding.
The record simply did not contain any evidence to support a finding
of actual disruption to classwork. There was also no evidence to show
that the T-shirts posed any threat of disruption to appropriate discipline. Furthermore, even though the view espoused on the T-shirts
may have been contrary to others' religious beliefs, this cannot provide
a basis for restriction because Boroff s view did not interfere with the
rights of any other students. It appears that the only viable argument
under Tinker that could have been made on these facts was that "the
work of the school" - the school's teaching of tolerance for individual
religious beliefs - was disrupted by Boroffs T-shirts.136 This may
have given the school a ground for restriction; however, one must remember that the disruption must be substantial and material. 13 7
This sort of passive expression, like the armband in Tinker, probably
would not have qualified.138
The second possibility - that Fraser,like Hazelwood, requires that
the student's vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech occur within a curricular event in order to be subject to restriction under a reasonableness
standard - is also a plausible interpretation of Fraser. However, the
Boroff court also rejected it. The speech in Fraser occurred within a
curricular event, namely a school-sponsored assembly held pursuant
to the student body election program that was supervised by faculty
and designed to teach students the democratic process.1 3 9 The Court
135. Boroff framed the constitutional examination as follows: "The way to analyze this
is to first determine whether the speech is 'vulgar or offensive.' If it is, then Fraser allows banning it, and the analysis is complete. Otherwise, apply Tinker and
examine if there is a threat of substantial disruption such that would allow the
school to ban the speech." Boroff, 220 F.3d at 469.
136. If we buy into the idea that schools teach, in part, as role models, it seems ironic
that the suppression of views with which the school does not agree is indicative of
tolerance. A persuasive argument can be made that tolerance could not be
taught, much less needed, where nothing disputatious exists to tolerate.
137. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
138. See id. at 514 (describing the armbands at issue as "a silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance" and, thus, improperly
restricted). But see McIntire v. Bethel Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp.
1415 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (finding that a school's restriction on student speech in
the form of T-shirts was governed by Tinker and was proper thereunder). The Tshirts at issue in McIntire involved a slogan that was associated with alcohol.
The school board was allowed qualified immunity because the plaintiffs right to
wear the shirts was not "clearly established" because "reasonable school officials
could forecast that the wearing of clothing bearing a message advertising an alcoholic beverage would substantially disrupt or materially interfere with the teaching of the adverse effects of alcohol" and was thus allowed under Tinker. Id. at
1421. In other words, the "work of the schools" was disrupted by the T-shirts.
Nonetheless, just because the student's right was not "clearly established" for the
purposes of qualified immunity, does not mean that such a right does not exist.
139. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
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in Hazelwood also categorized Fraseras standing for the proposition
that a school may "dissociate itself' from student speech that is contrary to its educational mission. 140 Dissociation implies sponsorship,
which is a fundamental requisite to the existence of a curricular
event. 14 1 In fact, Justice Brennan opined in his Fraser concurrence
that Fraser's speech "may well have been protected had he given it in
school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in2 teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were
14
less weighty."
Moreover, the Court in Hazelwood opined that the Fraseropinion
was grounded upon the school's "authority to refuse to sponsor student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol
use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the
shared values of a civilized social order."' 143 Given this characterization by the Court, the most plausible interpretation of Fraseris that it
rested upon the same curricular control principles that were later applied in Hazelwood.144 This being the case, one can easily analogize
the restriction in Fraserwith that of Hazelwood by realizing that the
restriction of indecent speech in the former reasonably related to the
legitimate educational function of the school to teach the values of civilized discourse during a school-sponsored curricular debate, whereas
in the latter the restriction reasonably related to the educational goal
of teaching proper journalism techniques in a school-sponsored
newspaper. 145
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1987).
See id.
478 U.S. at 689.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (emphasis added) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
Judge Gilman appropriately recognized this in his dissent, Boroff, 220 F.3d at
475, and other courts have followed just such an interpretation. See, e.g.,
Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (adhering to the
distinction between Tinker and Fraser/Hazelwoodbased on school-sponsorship in
upholding a school's restriction of a student handing out condoms with the phrase
"Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice" while running as a candidate in a school-sponsored election); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 531-33 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Goodwin, J., concurring) (noting that Frasershould not be stretched
beyond the curricular context); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that Fraser and Hazelwood are applicable to the ability of a school to
regulate speech in school-sponsored activities pursuant to its power to control the
curriculum); McIntire v. Bethel Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp. 1415
(W.D. Okla. 1992) (finding that T-shirts which are not school-sponsored, do not
bear and could not reasonably be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the
school and, thus, were not subject to Fraseror Hazelwood but rather were governed by Tinker).
145. Though, as the Boroff court noted, there is language in Hazelwood indicating that
the allowance of the restriction in Fraserwas based on the lewd character of the
speech, and not on a Tinker analysis, this does not mean that the speech did not
first have to occur within the curriculum. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72 n.4;
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 468-69. But see Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:443

This interpretation though, does not validate the Boroff court's
opinion because Boroffs speech cannot reasonably be characterized as
occurring within a curricular event as defined by Hazelwood. The
hallways of the school where Boroff expressed his views, while probably supervised by faculty, are not designed to impart any knowledge
upon the student. Nor can the wearing of a T-shirt within them reasonably be perceived by others as bearing the endorsement of the
school. Judge Gilman recognized this fact in his dissent.146 His reasoning rested on nothing less than the Supreme Court's statement in
Board of Education v. Mergens:14 7 "We think that secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school
does not endorse or support speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.... The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated."14 8
Furthermore, the fact that Boroffs passive expression of his viewpoint may also have occurred within the classroom cannot bring the
restriction under Hazelwood given the analogous facts of Tinker.
There the students wore their armbands both inside and outside the
classroom; however, the school was still held to a more demanding
standard than that applied in Hazelwood.1 4 9 Thus, this interpretation of Fraser- as merely foreshadowing Hazelwood - shows that had

the court engaged in this analysis, the case would have come out differently. If left to a Tinker analysis, as discussed above, the school's
restriction would have been without merit. 150
The Boroff court adopted the third possible interpretation of Fraser
- that a school is allowed to restrict vulgar, offensive, or lewd speech,
regardless of its curricular placement or disruptive effect, subject only
to a reasonableness standard of review. 15 1 As seen above, this interpretation is unjustified given the facts and reasoning of the Court in
Fraserand the way that case was treated by the Court in Hazelwood.
Moreover, given the propriety of the alternative interpretations of
Fraser, the fact that a school is only afforded a greater ability to re-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

(E.D. Va. 1992) (applying Fraseras a content-neutral manner restriction to allow
the restriction of a student wearing a T-shirt with words "Drugs Suck" contained
thereon without regard to the curricular placement of the speech). The court in
Broussard did not engage in the tolerance/sponsorship determination but did
note that even under Tinker the school officials could reasonably forecast a substantial disruption. Id. at 1537. Thus, the court there may not have been motivated to engage in the proper analysis.
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 475.
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
Id. at 250.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (describing the armbands at issue as "a silent, passive
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance" and, thus,
subject to restriction only upon a showing of substantial interference).
See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.

151. Boroff, 220 F.3d at 468-69.

2002]

OFFENSIVE STUDENT SPEECH

strict student speech when it occurs within its curriculum, and the
paramount justifications for requiring material and substantial interference under Tinker, the Boroff court was simply wrong in giving
Fraser an expanded meaning. As will be seen below, one need only
look to the facts and opinion of Boroff to realize that the application of
such an expanded meaning establishes an exception that swallows
Tinker's rule.
B.

Offensive Speech and Taking Offense to Students' Views

Though the extension of Fraser to speech that does not occur
within the curriculum and does not cause substantial interference is
clearly wrong, the Boroff court was equally misguided in its analysis
under Fraser. Even if we assume arguendo that Fraserstands for the
proposition that a school has the authority to restrict lewd, offensive,
or vulgar speech regardless of the curricular context in which it is uttered or its disruptive effect, one must then determine what speech
qualifies as lewd, offensive, or vulgar. As this section will show, "offensive" speech, in its constitutional sense, is qualified by the offensiveness of the manner chosen to communicate one's view - the
offensive form of the speech - rather than the offense one may take to
the view expressed by the speaker. While the evidence shows that the
school regarded Boroffs T-shirts as offensive because of its disagreement with the views expressed thereon, the court found the record devoid of any indication that the school based its restriction of Boroffs
speech on any message communicated thereby. Since finding that a
repugnant viewpoint did not motivate the school's actions was necessary to allow the application of Fraser in lieu of Tinker and Hazelwood, such a characterization appears to be an unprincipled
application of a label that enables simpler analysis.
speech is that
The dissent took the correct position that "offensive"
15 2
This view is
substance.
in
than
rather
form
in
offensive
is
which
completely commensurate with the holding in Fraser. The restriction
the speech,
in Fraserwas based on the sexually connotative form of
1 53
Presumaconveyed.
message
the
in
and not on any offensiveness
candidate
his
that
was
speech
Fraser's
by
conveyed
bly, the message
would take action on behalf of students and would thus be a prime
154 That message was simply not the
choice for the student council.
152. Id. at 473-74.
153. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 286 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Fraserexception is limited "to the appropriateness of the manner in which the
message is conveyed, not of the message's content"); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1193 (D. Utah 1999) ("Fraserspeaks to
the form and manner of student speech, not its substance. It addresses the mode
of expression, not its content or viewpoint.").
154. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring); supra note 30.
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basis for the school's action or the Court's opinion. Under the Court's
analysis, the sexually explicit metaphor used by Fraser was not regarded as constituting a message, but rather only represented the
form of expression used to communicate his view of the candidate.
There are numerous places in Fraserwhere the Court referred to the
ability of the school to regulate "the offensive form of expression,"1 55
"the use of expressions offensive to other[s],"156 inappropriate "modes
15
of expression,"157 and "what manner of speech ... is appropriate."D
In fact, the Court was careful to note that the actions of the school
were unrelated to any message the speaker may have espoused.15 9 As
such, it is clear that the restriction allowed in Fraserwas based upon
the form the message took and not on the content of the message
itself.
This principle is aptly demonstrated by the notion, articulated in
Fraser,that a student may be allowed to wear Tinker's armband but
not Cohen's jacket.i6o In Cohen v. California,161 the Court found the

application of a statue that criminalized "offensive conduct" unconstitutional. Paul Cohen was convicted of violating this statute for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft."162 The Court's
evaluation of the constitutionality of the statute's application to Cohen's speech under the First Amendment rested upon the premise
that offensiveness can only exist in the form of the expression, the use
of the word "fuck," rather than on any judgment about Cohen's express view of the draft: "[Cohen's] conviction ... can be justified, if at

all, only as a... regulation of the manner in which he exercised that

freedom, not as a ... prohibition on the substantive message it conveys."1 63 Thus, while Cohen's jacket may be an impermissible expres-

sion within the school,164 a similar jacket bearing the words "Draft
155. Fraser, 484 U.S. at 681.

156. Id.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Newman, J., concurring)).
403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
It is unnecessary to regard Fraseras defining an exception to Tinker in order for
the school to restrict such speech. Such would be the case because the use of
vulgarity within curricular events would be subject to certain restriction under
Hazelwood. Furthermore, the use of vulgarity outside of those events may pose
enough of an interference with the school's work that the school could restrict
such speech under Tinker. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Tinker would allow restriction in similar circumstances).
While it would be difficult to imagine a world where a school could not restrict

the use of obscenities in student communications, it remains to be seen exactly
what forms of speech qualify as "offensive" within the school. While the defini-
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Unfair" could not be excluded absent a showing of substantial interference or curricular placement.1 65 One cannot characterize a particular
view as "offensive" without per se engaging in some sort of judgment
about its propriety. As the dissent correctly noted, restrictions based
under "an all-but-irrebuttable
upon such a judgment are evaluated
1 66
presumption of unconstitutionality."
The Boroff majority, though, glossed over the evidence indicating
that the school may have considered Boroffs T-shirts offensive because of the views expressed thereby. It is possible that the court simply engaged in such an unprincipled analysis in order to avoid harder
questions posed by the application of Tinker and Hazelwood. The
court expressly stated that it found no evidence that any particular
tion of what manner of speech qualifies as "offensive" in the school setting may be
more lax than George Carlin's "dirty words," especially given the relatively tame
speech restricted in Fraser,it is not clear what standard would be determinative.
Fraser itself is partially based on the sexual nature of the speech used. See
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (referring to the "sexual content" of Fraser's speech as
distinguishing it from Tinker). Insofar as sexually explicit language is related to
obscenity, one could conclude that the ability to restrict speech under Fraseris at
least analogous to the ability of the government to restrict speech that falls
within those narrow categories afforded lesser First Amendment protection. See,
e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (demonstrating that obscenity is
afforded a lower level of First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (demonstrating that "fighting words" are subject to
restriction without any additional justifying circumstances).
Inasmuch as Frasermay help us flesh out this issue, the same reduced protection is not justifiably applied to Boroffs speech. The messages conveyed by his
shirts go to the very heart of the First Amendment. They involve issues of moral
controversy discussed at great length by scholars and lay people alike - the existence of God, the ability to learn while blinded by one's beliefs in a supreme being, the legality of drug use, individual insignificance, and the existence of truth.
See Boroff 220 F.3d at 467, 470. This sort of speech plainly does not fall within
any of the categories afforded lesser constitutional protection.
165. While a school can surely suppress a particular opinion under Tinker, see Tinker,
393 U.S. at 511, the ability to do the same under Hazelwood may be subject to
argument. On the one hand, the censorship of the articles in that case does appear to be based on the views espoused therein and the ability of the school to
refuse to sponsor speech contrary to the values it seeks to teach. On the other,
the opinion is also firmly based on the conflict such speech posed to the educational mission of the paper itself: the promotion of proper journalistic techniques.
See supra section II.C. To adopt the first basis as the fundamental reasoning of
the Court gives the school the necessary power to control its curriculum and effectively inculcate values. To adopt the second, adheres more to Tinker which
teaches us that schools are not to be "Orwellian guardian[s] of the public mind."
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This author tends to favor
the second view. If the school wishes to justify its teachings, then it should have
to do so in light of contrary views. If for example, socialism is advocated by a
student during a discussion of capitalism in a civics class, see id. at 279, the
school should address the issue. To merely bar the other side from the conversation gives the appearance of illegitimacy to the school's view.
166. Boroff, 220 F.3d at 473. Or, at the very least, must be evaluated under Tinker or
Hazelwood. See supra note 165.

472

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:443

"religious or political viewpoint" was used as the basis for restricting
Boroffs speech with regard to either his three-headed Jesus T-shirt or
the other T-shirts bearing only Marilyn Manson's image.16 7 However,
the record indicated that the principal found the three-headed Jesus
T-shirt particularly offensive because it displayed a distorted figure of
Jesus and because it bore the words "See No Truth. Hear No Truth.
Speak No Truth." and "BELIEVE" (highlighted as such).16s These
words and figures in themselves cannot reasonably be labeled as offensive.169 Rather, it appears that the only reasonable explanation for
the principal's characterization is that he took offense to the antiChristian message conveyed - that there is no truth, that Jesus is a
fraud, that faith is a lie.
This reasonable inference, which would have been enough to reverse the lower court given the procedural stance of the case, is buttressed by the fact the principal also stated that he found the threeheaded Jesus T-shirt offensive because "mocking this particular religious figure is particularly offensive to a significant portion of our
school community."17 0 As Judge Gilman aptly noted, it appears clear
that the principal found this shirt offensive because it said something
by mocking Jesus and because many people, including the principal,
"disagreed vehemently with what they perceived this T-shirt as saying."'17 Given this statement, it is ridiculous to say that no evidence
existed upon which to find the school restricted Boroffs speech in response to any religious viewpoint. One can take offense to many
things but "offensive" in its constitutional sense simply cannot be
based upon a judgment regarding the view espoused by a speaker.
Though the court opined that the three-headed Jesus T-shirt was
treated no differently than the T-shirts displaying Marilyn Manson's
picture,17 2 the justification for the restriction of the latter T-shirts has
even less of a basis. While Marilyn Manson's appearance may have
been "ghoulish and creepy,"17 3 the shirts were not evaluated by the
court or the school as offensive in form but rather were found offensive
because of their "reasonably supposed promotion" of "disruptive and
demoralizing values" derived from song lyrics,174 Marilyn Manson's
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Boroff, 220 F.3d at 470.
Id. at 469.
See supra note 164.
Boroff, 220 F.3d at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 470-71. As correctly noted by Judge Gilman's dissent, the form of expression used in these song lyrics easily qualifies as vulgar or offensive. Id. at 473-74;
see supra note 164. Under the court's interpretation of Fraser,if a student on
campus uttered these words, they could properly be disciplined. However, the
court explicitly relied upon the values promoted by the song lyrics: the substantive message they communicated.
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express views of certain subjects, and the association of certain viewpoints to Marilyn Manson through the media. 175 Given these statements, there are two glaring problems with the court's reasoning.
First, how could Boroff be said to promote "disruptive and demoralizing values" without expressing a viewpoint? The viewpoint is the
promotion of these detrimental values. Promotion is in its very essence the taking of a side on a subject. The principal in Boroff stated
as much in his affidavit: "I believe that the Marilyn Manson [TI-shirts
can reasonably be considered a communication agreeing with or ap-

proving of the views espoused by Marilyn Manson ... and ... associ17 6
ated to Marilyn Manson through articles in the press."

Offensiveness simply cannot be based upon the repulsiveness of the
message conveyed. In order to suppress such a viewpoint, disruption
must be shown under Tinker or the speech must be curricular under
Hazelwood. Neither was shown here.
Second, even if one accepts for the sake of argument that the Tshirts with only Marilyn Manson's picture did not express a viewpoint,
it cannot be avoided that the court's association of "demoralizing and
disruptive values" to these T-shirts in particular is absurd. It goes
without saying that some symbols can be closely associated with certain views. 177 For example, an armband can stand for opposition to
or a confederate
Vietnam, a raised middle finger for a vulgar phrase,
78 But, can one reaflag for the suppression of minority civil rights.1
sonably associate Marilyn Manson's face with the promotion of drug
use, violence, or intolerance based only upon his songs dealing with
such subjects or media portrayals of his views? If this is so, then the
school should have also stricken from its hallways all memorabilia
bearing the faces of the Beatles, Eric Clapton, Aerosmith, Snoop Dogg,
Madonna, the Rolling Stones, and Bill Clinton, as well as an infinite
175.
176.
177.
178.

Boroff, 220 F.3d at 470.
Id. at 469.
Again, we run into the unavoidable fact that Boroff clearly expressed a viewpoint.
The display of such a flag was at issue in Denno v. School Board, 218 F.3d 1267
(11th Cir. 2000), where school administrators were found to be entitled to qualified immunity because the student's right to display such a flag on school property during school hours but not as part of any school-sponsored event was not
"clearly-established." Id. at 1274-75. In so finding the court cited, among other
cases, West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.
2000). In West, the court found that the drawing and circulation of a confederate
flag by a student was properly punished under the Tinker analysis given the potential for substantial disruption in light of the history of race relations in the
school. Id. at 1366. Alternatively, the West court found that Fraser may allow
the restriction of such a flag even though it was not part of a school-sponsored
event. Id. Significantly though, neither the Tenth Circuit in West nor the Eleventh Circuit in Denno expressly found that Fraserextended that far. The former
court relied upon the Tinker disruption standard, id., while the latter declined to
reach the actual merits given the issue in the case was only whether the right of
the student was "clearly established," Denno, 218 F.3d at 1275.
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number of other household names that have lived lives, or become associated with activities through the media, which are contrary to the
social values the school wished to indoctrinate in its students.
Notwithstanding the attenuated nature of the association of demoralizing values to Marilyn Manson's picture, Boroff presented evidence that T-shirts with pictures of such bands as "Slayer" and
"Megadeth" were allowed along with patches bearing Marilyn Manson's face or name.179 These facts exemplify the absurdity of the notion that these particular T-shirts were "offensive" such that
regulation was necessary while other equally "offensive" shirts, under
the school's reasoning, were allowed.
Moreover, to allow other equally "offensive" images, while singling
out Boroffs T-shirts, tends to buttress the notion that it was Boroffs
message that was offensive to the authorities involved. Such motivation necessitates justification in the form of substantial interference or
curricular placement. In fact, the Court in Tinker found this sort of
selective enforcement of speech restrictions relevant to its finding that
the school had overstepped its authority, stating that "[c]learly, the
prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference ...

is not constitutionally permissible."180

The main reason the court was compelled to find that no viewpoint
was used as the basis for the school's action was to distinguish this
case from Tinker - which explicitly dealt with the suppression of particular views but required substantial interference - and Hazelwood -

which arguably allowed the restriction of particular views but required curricular placement - in order to allow the application of Fraser.1 This appears to be nothing more than the unreasoned
application of a label that was necessary to embark upon the path chosen by the court. There is really no question that the evidence adduced points to the fact that it was Boroffs message that was offensive
to the school officials. To say the school relied upon something else is
improbable, if not implausible.
A democratic society must tolerate that which is unpopular unless
the setting allows for the restriction.I8 2 In a school, the setting allows
179. Boroff 220 F.3d at 469.
180. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (finding such given the evidence presented that students
in the school were allowed to wear symbols of controversial significance, including an Iron Cross and buttons relating to national political campaigns).
181. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 468.
182. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. As the Third Circuit stated in striking down an antiharassment policy as overbroad: "The Supreme Court has held time and again,
both within and outside of the school context, that the mere fact that someone
might take offense at the content of speech is not sufficient justification for
prohibiting it." Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
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for such restrictions only when justified by substantial disruption or
curricular placement. The court, however, did not engage in the
proper analysis. By merely attaching the "offensive" and "not expressive of a viewpoint" labels to Boroffs speech, the court allowed the
school to restrict that which is plainly protected under the First
Amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The role of instilling values in our nation's youth is an exceedingly
important task. If we must entrust this function to state operated
public schools and compulsory education, we must also keep in mind
the risks associated with delegating the power of indoctrination to the
State. The key means of keeping these risks from fruition is the First
Amendment.
As has been discussed at length above, the Supreme Court has articulated standards for the restriction of student speech in order to
ensure that students are not stripped of their First Amendment right
to free speech. Simply put, the general rule is that a school can restrict student speech only if it materially and substantially interferes
with the work of the school, appropriate discipline, or the rights of
other students.1 8 3 Tinker is still the law and for good reason: to
strangle student viewpoints merely because they are contrary to that
would transform our schools into
which the school thinks is proper
"enclaves of totalitarianism."1 8 4 What is more, if our future leaders
are to understand the true value of the First Amendment, they must
learn to appreciate its protection through experience. These princi18 5
and are
ples were afforded substantial weight by the Tinker Court
today.
no less relevant
The fact that the Supreme Court recognized the school's inculcation role in Fraser and Hazelwood and decided that when speech occurs within a curricular event school authorities should have greater
control, does not invalidate the underlying premise of Tinker.
Granted, the school must retain control of discipline and its curriculum, but tolerance is the rule when a student's speech implicates
neither. Fraserwas completely in line with this fundamental underprinciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."), Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (finding that a school may not
prohibit speech based on the "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint"), and Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that ... the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive
to some of their hearers.")).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
184. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 21.
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standing. That case merely represents the notion that the school
teaches as a role model and thus may dissociate itself from offensively
lewd speech that materially interferes with teaching civilized public
discourse in a civics program.1 86 But, to give Frasera broader meaning, to extend this ability beyond the curriculum or disregard the notion of substantial interference, opens the door wide to restrictions
that are invalid under Tinker.
The Boroff majority missed this key component of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence and seized upon the term "offensive" to justify its restriction while the dissent recognized many of the flaws of
the majority's reasoning. Maybe the school could have justified its actions by restricting the religious viewpoint proffered by Boroff if that
view substantially interfered with the goal of teaching tolerance or
was expressed within a curricular event. However, there was no evaluation of whether the speech occurred within such an event nor was
there any evidence presented of material and substantial disruption.
As such, the ability of the school to restrict Boroffs speech simply did
not exist.
Though Marilyn Manson's views are not commensurate with mine,
I think it is imprudent, if not dangerous, to draw a line that cannot be
maintained in order to shield students from that which the State finds
repugnant. To restrict speech under the rubric of "offensiveness" is to
cultivate just such a distinction. The term "offensive" does not depict
a standard but an opinion. As Boroff shows, it is altogether too easy
for a school to attach such a label to speech with which it does not
agree. I cannot help but think that First Amendment protection is at
its best when we experience views we neither agree with nor respect.
Only then are we assured that the First Amendment is really working.
I fear that if John Tinker's armband was evaluated by the Van
Wert School and reviewed by a court under Boroff, that case would
have come out differently: with the court finding the school had constitutionally restricted Tinker's message because of its offensiveness.
The fears of the majority in Tinker may indeed become a reality if
courts allow school authorities to restrict all manner of student speech
that is deemed offensive precisely because it conflicts with what the
school wishes to teach.
One must always remember the potential for public schools to become so much a part of a "Brave New World."187 As John Stuart Mill
wrote many years ago:
A general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which
pleases the predominant power in the government - whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation 186. See supra text accompanying notes 26-41, 130-51.
187. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over

the mind.

18 8

18
As true today as it was in the days of Mill, and later in Tinker, 9
the perseverance of such essential freedoms as the First Amendment
is one of our only means of ensuring that truth is found among a variety of conflicting voices and is not simply infused in our children by
the State. If the First Amendment is to have a chance of persevering,
our future leaders must fully understand its power and not be taught
by those in control that its theoretical protections are fleeting in
reality.

Anthony B. Schutz

188.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY

129 (Currin V. Shields, ed., The Bobbs-Merrill

Company, Inc. 1956) (1859).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20, 120-27.
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